Bava Kamma 86

מיהו בן חורין דמשלם כופר ע"פ עצמו והיכי דמי דאי אתו סהדי ואסהידו ביה דקטל ולא ידעי אי תם הוה אי מועד הוה ואמר מריה דמועד הוא דמשלם כופר על פי עצמו היכא דליכא עדים משלם דמים

But [it is only in the case of] a freeman where <i>kofer</i> may sometimes be paid on the strength of the defendant's own admission — as where witnesses appeared and testified to the ox having killed [a freeman] without, however, knowing whether it was still <i>Tam</i> or already <i>Mu'ad</i> and the owner admits it to have been <i>Mu'ad</i>, in which case <i>kofer</i> would be paid on the strength of his own admission<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the ox in this case would be subject to be stoned, [and where the ox is stoned, the owner pays kofer]. ');">¹</span>

גבי עבד שאינו משלם קנס ע"פ עצמו והיכי דמי דאי אתו עדים ואסהידו ביה דקטל ולא ידעי אי תם הוה אי מועד הוה ואמר מריה מועד הוא לא משתלם קנס ע"פ עצמו היכא דליכא עדים לא משלם דמים

— that [we say] where witnesses are not at all available payment will be made for the actual value [of the loss]. [Whereas] in the case of a slave where the fixed fine could never be paid through the defendant's own admission — since even where witnesses appear and testify to the ox having killed [a slave], without knowing whether it had still been <i>Tam</i> or already <i>Mu'ad</i>, and the owner admits that it had already been <i>Mu'ad</i>, no fine would be paid — [we say] where no witnesses at all are available there will be no payment even for the amount of the value [of the loss].

מתיב רב שמואל בר רב יצחק כל שחייב בבן חורין חייב בעבד בין בכופר בין במיתה

R. Samuel son of R. Isaac raised an objection [from the following teaching]: Wherever there is liability in the case of a freeman,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. kofer. ');">²</span>

כופר בעבד מי איכא אלא לאו דמים

there is liability in the case of a slave both for <i>kofer</i> and for stoning. Now, how could <i>kofer</i> ever be [paid] in the case of a slave?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 244, n. 6. ');">³</span>

איכא דאמרי הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה איכא דאמרי אמר ליה רבה הכי קתני כל שחייב בבן חורין בכוונה על פי עדים כופר חייב בעבד קנס וכל שחייב בבן חורין שלא בכוונה ע"פ עדים דמים חייב בעבד שלא בכוונה על פי עדים דמים

Does it therefore not surely mean the payment for the amount of the value [of the loss]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [This shows that pecuniary loss is paid in the case of a slave on his own admission even as in the case of a freeman.] ');">⁴</span>

א"ל רבא אי הכי אשו שלא בכוונה ע"פ עדים נשלם דמים

— Some say that he raised the objection and he himself answered it, others say that Rabbah said to him: What is meant is as follows: Wherever there is liability for <i>kofer</i> [i.e.] in the case of a freeman killed intentionally [by the ox] as testified by witnesses, there is [a similar] liability for the fine in the case of a slave, and wherever there is liability for the amount of the value [of the loss, i.e.,] in the case of a freeman killed unintentionally, as testified by witnesses, there is also liability for the amount of the value [of the loss] in the case of a slave killed unintentionally, as testified by witnesses.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Though in the case of self-admission there will still be a distinction between the death of a freeman and that of a slave (by an ox) in regard to the payment of pecuniary loss.] ');">⁵</span>

ומנא ליה לרבא דלא משלם

Raba, however, said to him: If so,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [That there is payment of pecuniary loss, even where kofer is not payable.] ');">⁶</span>

אילימא מדתנן היה גדי כפות לו ועבד סמוך לו ונשרף עמו חייב עבד כפות לו וגדי סמוך לו ונשרף עמו פטור

why in the case of Fire unintentionally<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [If intentionally, the civil liability would merge with the graver capital charge.] ');">⁷</span>

האמר ריש לקיש כגון שהצית בגופו של עבד דקם ליה בדרבה מיניה

burning a human being [to death], as testified by witnesses, should there also not be liability to pay the amount of the value [of the loss]? And how did Raba know that no payment would be made [in this case]? Shall we say from the following Mishnah: '[Where fire was set to a barn and] a goat had been bound to it and a slave was loose near by it and all were burnt [with the barn] there would be liability.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the barn and the goat but not for the slave, as he should have run away. ');">⁸</span>

ואלא מהא דתניא חומר באש מבבור שהאש מועדת לאכול בין דבר הראוי לה בין דבר שאין ראוי לה מה שאין כן בבור ואילו שהאש משלמת שלא בכוונה דמים מה שאין כן בבור לא קתני

But where the slave had been chained to it, and the goat loose near by it and all were burnt with it there would be no liability.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 61b. ');">⁹</span>

דלמא תנא ושייר

[But how could Raba prove his point from this case here?]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By not extending the ruling in the second clause to refer also to the barn but confining it to the goat which should have run away, and to the slave, on the alleged ground that no compensation should be paid for the value of the loss occasioned by fire burning a human being to death. ');">¹⁰</span>

אלא רבא גופיה אבעויי מבעיא ליה אשו שלא בכוונה מי משלם דמים או לא

Did Resh Lakish not state that this case here should be explained as one where e.g., the defendant put the actual fire upon the body of the slave so that [no other<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The ruling of exemption in the second clause is thus extended even to the barn. ');">¹¹</span>

מי אמרינן גבי שור הוא דבכוונה משלם כופר שלא בכוונה משלם דמים אבל אשו דבכוונה לא משלם כופר שלא בכוונה נמי לא משלם דמים או דלמא כיון דגבי שורו שלא בכוונה אע"ג דליכא כופר משלם דמים גבי אשו נמי אע"ג דבכוונה לא משלם כופר שלא בכוונה מיהת משלם דמים

but] the major punishment had to be inflicted? But [it may perhaps be suggested that Raba derived his point] from the following [Baraitha]: For it has been taught: 'The excess in [the liability] for Fire over [that for] Pit is that Fire is apt to consume both things fit for it and things unfit for it, whereas this is not so in the case of Pit.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 38. ');">¹²</span>

ולא ידעינן תיקו:

It is not, however, said that 'in the case of Fire [where a human being has been burnt to death] unintentionally there is liability to pay for the pecuniary loss, whereas it is not so in Pit'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For which see supra p. 18 and infra 50b. ');">¹³</span>

כי אתא רב דימי א"ר יוחנן כופר מה ת"ל (שמות כא, ל) אם כופר לרבות כופר שלא בכוונה ככופר בכוונה

But might [the Baraitha] not perhaps have stated [some points] and omitted [others]? — It must therefore have been that Raba himself was questioning whether in the case of Fire [burning a human being] unintentionally there would be payment for the amount of the value [of the loss] or whether there would be none. Should we say that it was only in the case of cattle — where if the manslaughter was unintentional <i>kofer</i> would be paid — that for unintentional manslaughter the amount of the value [of the loss] is to he paid — whereas in the case of Fire — where for intentional manslaughter no <i>kofer</i> would be paid<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For it merges with the graver capital charge. ');">¹⁴</span>

א"ל אביי אלא מעתה עבד נמי מה ת"ל (שמות כא, לב) אם עבד לרבות עבד שלא בכוונה כעבד בכוונה וכי תימא הכי נמי והאמר ריש לקיש שור שהמית את העבד שלא בכוונה פטור משלשים שקלים

— there should be no payment of the amount of the value [of the loss] for unintentional manslaughter? Or [shall we] perhaps [rather say that] since in the case of Cattle [killing a person] unintentionally where no <i>kofer</i> is paid, the value [of the loss] is nevertheless paid, so should it also be with Fire where no <i>kofer</i> would be paid for intentional manslaughter, that nevertheless the value [of the loss] caused by unintentional manslaughter should be paid? But as no information was available to us [on this matter], it remained undecided.

א"ל גברא אגברא קא רמית

When R. Dimi arrived [from Palestine] he said on behalf of R. Johanan: [The word] <i>kofer</i> [I understand]. What is taught by [the expression] If <i>kofer</i>?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 30; for it is surely neither an optional nor a conditional liability. ');">¹⁵</span>

כי אתא רבין א"ר יוחנן עבד מה תלמוד לומר אם עבד לרבות עבד שלא בכוונה כעבד בכוונה

It implies the inclusion of [the payment of] <i>kofer</i> in cases where there was no intention<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' ['If' [H] implying a case where kofer is imposed, though the ox is not stoned, i.e. where there was no intention (contrary to the view of Rabbah, supra); v. Malbim on Ex. XXI, 30.] ');">¹⁶</span>

ולריש לקיש נמי נימא מדעבד אם עבד לא דריש כופר אם כופר נמי לא דריש

[to kill] just as <i>kofer</i> [is paid] where there was intention. Abaye however said to him: If so, the same could now surely also be argued in the case of a slave: viz.: What is taught by [the expression] <i>If a slave</i>?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 30; for it is surely neither an optional nor a conditional liability. ');">¹⁵</span>

אמרי לא עבד אם עבד לא דריש כופר אם כופר דריש

[It implies] that a slave killed unintentionally is subject to the same law as a slave, killed intentionally? If that is so, why did Resh Lakish say that where an ox killed a slave unintentionally there would be exemption from the thirty <i>shekels</i>? He replied: Would you confute one person's view by citing another?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As R. Johanan and Resh Lakish might perhaps have differed on this point. ');">¹⁷</span>

ומאי שנא עבד אם עבד לא כתיב במקום תשלומין כופר אם כופר כתיב במקום תשלומין

When Rabin arrived [from Palestine] he said on behalf of R. Johanan: [The word] a slave<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In Ex. XXI, 32. ');">¹⁸</span>

וכן בבן או בבת ת"ר (שמות כא, לא) או בן יגח או בת יגח לחייב על הקטנים כגדולים

[I understand], What is taught by [the expression] If a slave? [It implied] that a slave [killed] unintentionally is subject to the same law as a slave [killed] intentionally. Now as regards Resh Lakish [who was of a different view in this respect] shall we also assume that just as he drew no lesson from the distinction between <i>'a slave'</i> and <i>'if a slave'</i>, so he drew no lesson from the distinction between '<i>kofer</i>' and 'if <i>kofer</i>'? — I may say that this was not so. From the distinction between <i>'a slave'</i> and <i>'if a slave'</i> he did not draw a lesson, whereas from the distinction between '<i>kofer</i>' and 'if <i>kofer</i>' he did draw a lesson. Why this difference? The expressions <i>'a slave'</i> and '<i>if a slave'</i> do not occur in the context dealing with payment,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It could thus hardly have any bearing on the law of payment. ');">¹⁹</span>

והלא דין הוא הואיל וחייב אדם באדם וחייב שור באדם מה כשחייב אדם באדם לא שנא בין קטנים לגדולים אף כשחייב שור באדם לא תחלוק בו בין קטנים לגדולים

whereas the expressions '<i>kofer</i>' and 'if <i>kofer</i>' do occur in a context dealing with payment.

ועוד קל וחומר הוא ומה אדם באדם שלא עשה בו קטנים כגדולים חייב בו על הקטנים כגדולים

THE SAME JUDGMENT APPLIES IN THE CASE OF A SON OR IN THAT OF A DAUGHTER. Our Rabbis taught: [The text] <i>Whether it have gored a son or have gored a daughter</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. 31. ');">²⁰</span> [implies] that there is liability in the case of little ones just as in that of grown-ups. But surely this is only logical! For since there is a liability in the case of Man killing man there is similarly a liability in the case of Cattle killing man, just as where Man has killed man no distinction is made between [the victims being] little ones or grown-ups,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Nid. 44a. ');">²¹</span> so also where Cattle killed man no distinction should be made between [the victims being] little ones or grown-ups? Moreover there is an <i>a fortiori</i> argument [to the same effect]; for if in the case of Man killing man where the law did no make [murderers who are] minors liable as [it did make] grown-ups,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' See Lev. XXIV, 17 and Mek. on Ex. XXI, 12. ');">²²</span> it nevertheless imposed there liability for little ones as for grown-ups,